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JUSTICE DOUGLAS AND THE ROSENBERG
CASE: A REJOINDER
Michael E. Parrisht
In Justice Douglas and the Rosenberg Case: Setting the Record
Straight,' Professor William Cohen argues that my critical interpretation 2 of Justice Douglas's behavior in the celebrated "atom spy"
case of 1953 is seriously flawed. This is so, he writes, because I
failed to appreciate the fact that Justice Douglas only voted to review cases that raised "substantial" legal questions and because in
reconstructing the Supreme Court's disposition of the Rosenberg
case, I relied upon a key source written by a member of the Court
(Justice Felix Frankfurter) known to be hostile to Douglas. The
larger conclusion that Cohen hopes to establish by disputing my interpretation is quite simple: Douglas never deviated from deciding
the issues on "the merits" and remained unaffected by the fierce
political controversy surrounding the case.
Professor Cohen does not dispute that Justice Douglas voted
against reviewing the Rosenberg case on numerous occasions prior to
issuing his famous stay of execution on June 17, 1953. 3 He did so,
Cohen claims, because he always treated capital cases with great circumspection, insisting "there was no point in reviewing even a case
in which a life was at stake unless the case presented some legal
4
issue that could arguably provide a basis for action by the Court."
Douglas believed that the initial appeals in the Rosenberg case lacked
substance. At the last moment, when less frivolous claims were
presented, he supported review. According to Cohen,5 Douglas's
behavior in this case was consistent with his behavior in other signif6
icant capital cases, such as Chessman v. Teets.
I am baffled by Cohen's reliance on Douglas's behavior in the
Chessman case. Despite its notoriety, the case of California's "red
light bandit" seems remote from the issues raised by the trial of the
Professor of History, University of California, San Diego.
Cohen,JusticeDouglas and the Rosenberg Case: Setting the Record Straight, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 211 (1985).
2 Parrish, Cold WarJustice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs, 82 AM. Hisr. REv.
t

1

805 (1977).
3

Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 313 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting)

(appendix quoting stay opinion ofJune 17).
4

Cohen, supra note 1, at 217.

5
6

Id.
354 U.S. 156 (1957).
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Rosenbergs. The Rosenbergs had been tried and convicted in federal court and sentenced to die for the crime of conspiracy to commit espionage. During the trial, the issue of their ties to the
Communist Party had been emphasized by the prosecution. 7 This
was, in short, a political trial, perhaps the most notorious one in the
nation's history. I found Douglas's behavior in this case bizarre, not
because I believed him to be unusually sensitive with respect to capital punishment, but because he had shown himself to be alert to the
dangers of political repression in America during the height of the
Cold War.8 Rather than comparing Justice Douglas's behavior in
Rosenberg to his behavior in Chessman, I would compare it to his behavior in other politically charged cases, such as United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,9 Screws v. United States,' 0 and Schneiderman v. United
States." In those cases, as in Rosenberg,Justice Douglas attempted to
12
straddle controversial issues.
One might assume that ajustice who had spoken out against the
14
3
threat to civil liberties posed by loyalty oaths' and the Smith Act
would see the danger to fundamental rights raised by the trial of
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. At the very least one might have expected that such ajustice, one who, as Felix Frankfurter noted, "has
created for himself the reputation of being especially sensitive to the
claims of injustice,"' 15 would have been willing to give the
Rosenbergs an early hearing.
I am willing to concede, however, that Douglas may have found
the original petitions for certiorari, which focused upon the treason
clause, cruel and unusual punishment, rebuttal witnesses, and the
conduct ofJudge Kaufman, to be without legal merit, 16 despite the
fact that his old Yale Law School-New Deal colleague, Jerome Frank,
suggested that the Court review certain aspects of the court of appeals decision 17 and despite the fact that three other members of the
Court (Black, Frankfurter, and Burton) believed, for a variety of rea7

Record at 226-30, Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 965 (1953) (prosecutor's

opening statement).
8 See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
9
10
11
12

315 U.S. 289 (1942).
325 U.S. 91 (1945).
320 U.S. 118 (1943).
See infra text accompanying notes 41-52.

13 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 731 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
14
15

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Parrish, supra note 2, at 824 (quoting F. Frankfurter, Frankfurter to Burton (May

23, 1953) (available in Harold Burton Papers, Library of Congress, box 248)).
16

17

See Cohen, supra note 1, at 220-27.
United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605-07, 611 (2d Cir. 1952) (sug-

gesting need for Supreme Court review of scope of review of sentencing and of treason
clause issue).
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sons, that the case should be heard.18 But I am not convinced that
Cohen has offered a convincing explanation of Douglas's behavior
with respect to the second petition in the spring of 1953, conduct
which led Justice Jackson to remark to Justice Frankfurter that it was
"the dirtiest, most shameful, most cynical performance that I think I
have ever heard of in matters pertaining to law."' 19
In this second petition, attorneys for the Rosenbergs argued
that their clients had been denied due process of law because of
misconduct by the prosecution, specifically the statements made to
newspaper reporters by prosecutor Irving Saypol in connection with
the indictment of one William Perl, a potential witness against the
couple. The court of appeals rejected this claim on the grounds that
the Rosenbergs' attorney failed to make a timely objection during
the trial,20 but Judge Swan condemned Saypol's conduct as "wholly
reprehensible." 2' At the time the Second Circuit stayed the execution order to permit an appeal of Swan's ruling, both Judge Frank
and Judge Hand suggested that the Supreme Court might take the
case. Frank stated that "for my part, I believe the Supreme Court
should hear it."22 Judge Learned Hand stated that "I would be unwilling to foreclose the possibility of taking this question to the
'2 3
Supreme Court."
Douglas, however, refused to vote for certiorari in the conference on April 11, 1953, when Black and Frankfurter, now alone
among the nine, urged the other justices to do so. 24 Over a month
later, shortly before the Court order denying the petition was due to
be published, Douglas suddenly found merit in the new claims. He
circulated a memorandum, dated May 22, which asked that the denial carry his dissent: "Mr. Justice Douglas, agreeing with the Court
of Appeals that some of the conduct of the United States Attorney
was 'wholly reprehensible' but, believing, in disagreement with the
Court of Appeals, that it probably prejudiced the defendants seri'25
ously, votes to grant certiorari.
18
See Rosenberg, 346 U.S. at 300-01 ("I have long thought that. . . automatic review
by the highest court. . . in cases which involve the death penalty was a good practice.")
(Black, J., dissenting); Parrish, supra note 2, at 817 (quoting Frankfurter as stating in
conference that "the rare cases in which federal courts imposed death sentences should
generally. . . be reviewed by us"); id. at 818 (Burton favored reviewing case because of
strong feelings of two other Justices).
19
F. Frankfurter, Rosenberg Memorandum 6 (June 4, 1953) (available in Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, box 65, file 1).
20
United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1952).
21
Id. at 670.
22 N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1953, at 1, 12.
23
Id. at 12.
24
Parrish, supra note 2, at 822.
25 Id. at 823-24 (quoting W.O. Douglas, Memorandum to the Conference (May 22,
1953) (available in Harold Burton Papers, Library of Congress, box 248)).
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Douglas's bombshell, what Frankfurter called his "last-minute
change of position,"' 26 prompted reconsideration of the Rosenberg
case in the conference on May 23. There, according to Frankfurter's account, Jackson cast the fourth vote to grant certiorari.
Douglas withdrew his memorandum because "what he had written
was badly drawn, he guessed," andJackson then switched his vote to
the negative, which killed the grant. 2 7 Frankfurter reported that
shortly after the conference broke up, Jackson said, with reference
to Douglas: "That S.O.B.'s bluff was called." 28 When the official
order of the Court denying certiorari was published on May 25, it
noted only that Justice Douglas "is of the opinion [it] should be
29
granted."
Professor Cohen concedes that Douglas probably made "two
mistakes" in this second round of the Rosenberg case:
At first, he failed to recognize that the issue concerning [Saypol]
was substantial. Later, he proposed a dissent that, as worded,
might be read as a dissent on the merits of that issue. If he can be
be no basis for
criticized for making these mistakes, there should
30
them.
corrected
he
that
criticism
or
surprise
But is that all one can say about Douglas's behavior, that he made
"two mistakes" and corrected them? Why was Frankfurter so agitated? What did Jackson mean by his remarks? What did they believe to be Douglas's motive? In this round of the case did Douglas
play to the grandstand, placing his own image above other interests
in the case?
Forty-one days elapsed between Douglas's refusal to vote for
certiorari on April 11 and the circulation of his memorandum, three
days before the official announcement of denial by the Court. During this interval, Justice Frankfurter, for one, brooded about the
case frequently as he debated whether or not to write a dissent from
the denial. 3 1 Cohen would have us believe that Douglas waited until
the last moment to reexamine the record, dashed off a carelessly
worded memorandum which accused the other justices of ignoring
conduct which "prejudiced the defendants seriously," and then
withdrew the offending document forthrightly when this "mistake"
26 Id. at 824 (quoting from F. Frankfurter, Frankfurter to Burton (May 23, 1953)
(available in Harold Burton Papers, Library of Congress, box 248)).
27 F. Frankfurter, supra note 19, at 8.
28 Id. at 9.
Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 965, 966 (Douglas, J., dissenting from de29
nial of certiorari) (1953).
Cohen, supra note 1, at 236.
30
31
Parrish, supra note 2, at 823 (quoting from F. Frankfurter, Memorandum for the
Conference (May 20, 1953) (available in Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, box 65, file 7)).
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was called to his attention by Justice Jackson and others.3 2
There is support for Professor Cohen's interpretation of these
events. Admittedly, Justice Douglas often worked quickly. 33 However, there are two reasons why Professor Cohen's explanation is
doubtful. First, accepting that the memorandum's strong language
was unintentional,3 4 why withdraw it once it had prompted Jackson
to switch his vote? If Justice Douglas thought the issues merited
review, standing by the strongly worded memorandum, even though
the strength was not intended, to pressure acceptance of the case
does not strike me as unseemly. Second, the granting of certiorari
made the offending document irrelevant. It seems reasonable,
therefore, to explore alternative explanations of the events.
Douglas knew perfectly well that his memorandum, declaring
the circuit court wrong on the law, had forced a reconsideration of
the certiorari decision in the May 23 conference. After seeing the
memorandum, Jackson challenged Douglas by switching his position and voting to grant. Although he privately denounced Saypol's
conduct to Frankfurter, 3 5 Jackson must have believed that the circuit
court had not erred. Here is how Frankfurter described Jackson's
motives in the conference:
Jackson.

.

. said he too would now grant, because the Court, it

seemed to him was put in an impossible position by Douglas'
memorandum. There were now, he said, four people who at different stages had voted to grant. .

.

. This, he continued was

bound to leak. Furthermore, it was now to be publicly said by a
member of the Court that the Rosenbergs had not had a fair trial.
36
It was impossible to deny under those circumstances.
Frankfurter relates that the discussion then turned to scheduling argument of the case:
At about this point, the discussion having gone on for quite some
little time, Douglas spoke up. He had been quiet since announcing that he would grant. He ought to say something, he started.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 234-36.
Parrish, supra note 2, at 826.
34 Professor Cohen believes that the strong language resulted from haste. My theory is that the language was intended to invoke liberal sympathies for Douglas. Neither
of us embrace a third possibility that the memorandum was specifically intended to pressure the otherJustices to accept the case and Douglas simply backed down in the face of
Jackson's attack. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 236 (asserting that Douglas did not participate in lobbying within the Court); Parrish, supra note 2, at 826. Justice Jackson's law
clerk at the time, William H. Rehnquist, asserted that Douglas's motive was indeed "to
force the hand of the court and get the result he now so belatedly wants." J. SIMON,
INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAs 302 (1980) (quoting Rehnquist Memorandum, In re Rosenberg, Robert Jackson Papers, University of Chicago Law
School).
35
F. Frankfurter, supra note 19, at 5-6.
32
33

36

Id. at 7.
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What he had written was badly drawn, he guessed. He hadn't realized it would embarrass anyone. He would just withdraw his
memorandum if that would help matters.
If Douglas' memorandum was withdrawn, Jackson said, we
were exactly where we had been before, and there was no longer
any reason for him to change his vote ....

The petition for certi-

orari was thus, again, denied, and we turned to other matters.3 7

Assuming Frankfurter's account to be substantially correct,
Douglas withdrew his memorandum after the grant of certiorari had
been made. Jackson immediately switched back to voting against review as a consequence. Douglas cannot have been under any illusions that the principal reason for Jackson's vote had been the
memorandum, which he read as stating that the circuit court had
been wrong and that Saypol's conduct "probably prejudiced the defendants seriously." Therefore, contrary to Professor Cohen's belief that Justice Douglas could not have known that withdrawal of
the memorandum would cause Jackson to switch back,3 8 Douglas
had reason to believe that withdrawal would prevent Court review of
the case. Jackson, throwing down the gauntlet to Douglas, said, in
effect, I think you are wrong on the law; we should have the issue
fully briefed and argued before deciding it. Douglas then withdrew
the offending document. He did so in order to kill the grant of certiorari. Neither Professor Cohen's nor any other explanation of
Douglas's behavior is credible.
Douglas did not have to "withdraw" the document if he simply
believed it had been poorly drafted. The vote to grant certiorari
made that concern irrelevant because the denial order would not be
published on Monday morning and, therefore, neither would his
dissent. All Douglas had to do was sit tight and say nothing; his
"badly drawn" memorandum would not be filed and the
Rosenbergs would still have their day in court. Was this a mere tactical blunder on his part? I think not. When the order denying certiorari was finally published on Monday, Douglas remained in
dissent, minus the provocative statement that the prosecutor's conduct had "probably prejudiced the defendants seriously."'3 9 Because this was the only issue raised by the petition, how could
Douglas remain in dissent, unless he continued to believe there was
merit to the argument and that the circuit court had "probably"
erred?
If Douglas adhered to his publicly recorded view that these isId. at 8.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 233-34.
39 Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 965, 966 (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (1953).
37
38
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sues were substantial, it is curious that in private he would move to
kill the petition; he should have desired to see substantial issues
briefed and argued, as Justice Jackson was willing to do. It is incredible that Douglas, if he thought the issues substantial, would have
backed down in conference merely to avoid "embarrassing" Jackson, especially when the grant of certiorari obviated the embarrassing memorandum. On the contrary, Justice Douglas's goal was to
record a public dissent from the denial of certiorari; such a dissent
would allow Douglas to stand up for the Rosenbergs against a Court
that refused even to hear the case.
At the conference, Douglas realized that he would be unable to
publish such a strong statement in his dissent from the denial of
certiorari; Jackson would vote to grant certiorari rather than allow
publication of Douglas's memorandum. Although Professor Cohen
argues that a dissent on the merits after full consideration of the
case might have bolstered Douglas's libertarian credentials even
more than a simple notation of dissent from the denial of certiorari,40 Douglas did not care for this option because he did not want
the Court to hear the case. He did not want the case heard because
although he treasured his libertarian credentials, he also loathed
communism and did not wish to see the Court stand in the way of
the quick execution of the Rosenbergs. Grandstanding may not be
the appropriate word to describe Douglas's behavior. The reader
may search for a better one.
Professor Cohen has argued that Douglas's behavior in the Rosenberg case was perfectly consistent with his behavior in comparable
circumstances. In one respect this is true. The Rosenberg case is not
the only occasion on which Justice Douglas shifted his vote in a controversial case and attempted to straddle the issues. At least three
other cases come to mind.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 4 1 the Justices enforced a
series of World War I contracts made between the federal government and the steelmaker despite allegations that the agreements,
which yielded Bethlehem extraordinary profits, had been made
under "duress" and were "unconscionable" as a matter of law.
Douglas voted in the majority and joined in Black's opinion for the
Court.4 2 However, Douglas also filed a concurrence which, accord-

ing to Frankfurter, appeared only at the last minute.4 3 The concurrence argued that the agreements had contained an implied promise
Bethlehem would achieve certain production efficiencies before
40
41
42

Cohen, supra note 1, at 232.
315 U.S. 289 (1942).
Id. at 338 (Douglas, J., concurring).

43

J. LAsH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 257 (1975).
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reaping the profits. Without persuasive evidence on this point, he
said, they could not collect. But since the lower court had resolved
this issue the other way, he was compelled to swallow his doubts and
uphold the agreements. 44 In other words, Douglas tried to straddle
the dispute. Frankfurter relates that the Douglas opinion outraged
Justice Murphy, who had earlier rejected this analysis of the contracts as unfounded, although he, too, believed the profits to be
contrary to the public interest and destructive of the war effort.
"The Bethlehem case," he later told Frankfurter, "first put me wise
45
to Bill Douglas."
A year later, when a narrow majority on the Court overturned
the government's efforts to strip Communist Party leader William
Schneiderman of his citizenship and deport him, 46 Douglas again
attempted to straddle a controversial question. The Court held that
the government failed to demonstrate that Schneiderman did not
adhere to the principles of the Constitution and obtained his citizenship fraudently. 4 7 Douglas filed a concurring opinion, which agreed
that the prosecution had failed to establish fraud in the case, but
also pointed out that Congress could prevent naturalization of communists if it desired to do S0.48 Justice Murphy, who wrote the majority opinion, expressed to Frankfurter his shock at what he termed
Douglas's "skulduggery" in seeking to appease the country's "antiCommunist sentiment" while at the same time helping to block
49
Schneiderman's deportation.
Finally, in the landmark case of Screws v. United States,50 Douglas
wrote a fence-straddling opinion for the plurality which sustained
the constitutionality of sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 but
reversed the conviction of a white Georgia sheriff who had been
convicted under that law after beating a black prisoner to death.
The conviction could not stand, Douglas argued, because the judge
had failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that the sheriff "willfully" intended to deprive his victim of rights secured by the United
States Constitution. 5 1 As Justice Murphy noted in his biting dissent,
the finding of "willfulness" added nothing to the statute; law enforcement officials did not need a comprehensive law library to
know that "the right to murder individuals in the course of their
44

315 U.S. at 340-42.

45

J. LASH, supra note 43, at 330 (1975); S. FINE,

FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON

YEARS 348 (1984).
46
47
48
49

50

51

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
Id. at 135-36.
Id at 163 (Douglas, J., concurring).
J. LASH, supra note 43, at 257-58; S. FINE, supra note 45, at 414-15.
325 U.S. 91 (1945) (4-1-4 decision).
Id. at 106-07.
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duties is unrecognized in this nation." 5 2 Douglas's stand threw a
bone to civil rights groups, while at the same time appeasing southern racists.
I have again relied on Justice Frankfurter for the behind the
scenes events in two of these cases. The United States Reports,
however, speak for themselves; in these instances Justice Douglas
attempted to play to both sides of a controversial issue.
In the Rosenberg case, I believe, Justice Douglas was emotionally
divided between his own self-image as the judicial champion of the
underdog and his equally powerful loathing for communism and
those who betray their country. When Americans for Democratic
Action, those tough-minded liberals, endorsed him for the presidency in 1948, 5 3 they did so because he had "correct" beliefs on
civil liberties, industrial relations, the United Nations, and communism. Dorothy Bailey's defender 54 was also a strong supporter of
Ngo Dinh Diem.5 5 In his Dennis dissent, Douglas stated that "the
doctrine of Soviet revolution is exposed in all of its ugliness and the
American people want none of it,'"56 and described American com'5 7
munists as "miserable merchants of unwanted ideas."
Professor Cohen concludes that when Justice Douglas, acting as
Second Circuit Justice, granted the stay of execution based on the
Atomic Energy Act issue, he "showed the courage and conviction
for which he is best remembered. 5 8s Admittedly, Justice Douglas
stood on firm legal ground in granting the stay. 59 However, as Professor Cohen concedes, by the time he issued the stay, Justice Douglas was operating in a vacuum; he had no support from his
colleagues on the Court. 60 Even before Douglas granted the stay,
the ChiefJustice had begun preparations to overturn it.61 Professor
Cohen is correct that the other members of the Court are also responsible for the "institutional failure" of those final days. 62 One
can only speculate, however, as to whether Justice Douglas would
have shown the courage to grant the stay had his fellow Justices not
already been moving to strike it down with alarming speed.
Contrary to Professor Cohen's allegation, I have never argued

54

Id. at 136-37 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
SeeJ. SIMON, supra note 34, at 271 (1980).
See W.O. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 313-14 (1974).

55

See W.O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 207-08 (1980).

52

53

56
57
34, at
58
59

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 588 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 589; see also W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 55, at 304-05; J. SIMON, supra note
271.
Cohen, supra note 1, at 250.
Id. at 247; Parrish, supra note 2, at 834.
60 Cohen, supra note 1, at 248 n.195; Parrish, supra note 2, at 834-35.
61 Parrish, supra note 2, at 834-35.
62
Cohen, supra note 1, at 247.
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thatJustice Douglas was the "principal villain" in the Rosenberg case.
I can think of other, more appropriate candidates for that title. But
neither do I believe that Justice Douglas was the hero of the case, a
point of view that his partisans continue to espouse despite a great
deal of evidence to the contrary.

